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This article discusses the contribution of critical political economy approaches to digital 
journalism studies and argues that these offer important correctives to celebratory 
perspectives. The first part offers a review and critique of influential claims arising from self-
styled new studies of convergence culture, media and creative industries. The second part 
discusses the contribution of critical political economy in examining digital journalism and 
responding to celebrant claims. The final part reflects on problems of restrictive normativity 
and other limitations within media political economy perspectives and considers ways in 
which challenges might be addressed by more synthesizing approaches. The paper proposes 
developing radical pluralist media systems and comparative analysis and advocates drawing 
on strengths in both political economy and culturalist traditions to map and evaluate practices 
across all sectors of digital journalism.  
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For over two decades we have been invited to share a tantalizing array of celebratory visions 
for digital journalism in which what is emergent promises to be far better than what has gone 
before. The Internet will revitalise journalism and democracy by shifting control from an elite 
cadre of gatekeepers to the dispersed interaction of bloggers, social networks and consumers, 
argues Rupert Murdoch (2006). For some, the vision has been one of replacing old forms of 
journalism with new, while others have highlighted collaboration between paid professional 
journalists and citizen journalist amateurs (Deuze 2009a, 2009b; Beckett 2008; Allan and 
Thorsen 2009, 2014). Unsurprisingly not all those affiliated with legacy media have joined 
the celebrations but we might expect that a tradition of media scholarship formed in 
opposition to mass media dominance might find plenty to cheer. Yet, critical political 
economists have tended instead to critique various claims as “myths”, while arguing that the 
capacity to realise others is constrained by the political economies in which they emerge. 
I will build upon arguments that critical political economy (CPE) offers some essential 
elements for the analysis and evaluation of digital journalism and provides a necessary 
corrective for aspects ignored or downplayed in other celebratory perspectives. Yet I also 
want to advance a more open and exploratory political economy by exploring space between 
the analytical and normative dimensions of CPE scholarship. The first part offers a review 
and critique of influential claims arising from more celebratory perspectives. The second part 
discusses the contribution of CPE in examining digital journalism and responses to celebrant 
claims. The final part reflects on problems and limitations within media political economy 
perspectives and considers ways in which challenges might be addressed by more 
synthesizing analytical and theoretical approaches.  
 
Part 1: Celebrant claims 
 
Mansell (2012) categorises various writers on the Internet into two groups, “celebrants” and 
“skeptics”. Applied to accounts of digital journalism, there would appear to be little in 
common in “celebrant” accounts, initially at least, beyond the fact that there are emergent 
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features that are positively evaluated. Some are pro and others anti capitalist, some identify 
positive futures for established media, others for commercial digital natives, others for non-
profit or low-profit journalism, others for the dissolution of journalism. This diversity 
illustrates and mirrors the baffling dissensus that Curran finds across claims about the future 
of journalism: 
Leaders of the news industry proclaim that they are successfully managing a 
transition; numerous journalists declare that there is a crisis of journalism that is 
damaging democracy; millenarians look forward to radical renewal; and some liberal 
educators declare that a journalistic renaissance has already begun. (Curran 2011, 
113-4) 
What tends to be common is the incorporation of a broader set of claims about digital 
communications and Web 2.0. McChesney (2013, 174) summarises four compelling claims, 
arguing enthusiasm for them is entirely understandable, yet problematic in the light of the 
gaps between vision and realisation:  
i. A greater number of people are able to participate online as barriers to entry fall 
ii. Journalists, like “everyone else”, have greater access to the world’s information  
iii. Journalists “will be able to collaborate and draw from the intelligence and labor of 
countless others in a networked environment” 
iv. The Internet lowers costs of production and “effectively eliminates the cost of distribution 
so journalists can have a digital readership in the tens of millions with barely any budget at 
all”. 
These communication claims relate to broader conceptions that the Internet provides a 
dynamic, open environment which favours innovative network operations that bring together 
supply and demand, so that approximations of perfect competition can be realised. The 
advantages that favoured monopolists in the old economy now favour nimble, networked 
enterprises, “start ups” and SME (small and medium-sized enterprises) market entrants. 
According to Leadbeater (2009, xix) the mass media “boulders” of the pre-digital age “have 
been drowned by a rising tide of pebbles” in a new “organisational landscape” in which new 
media companies such as Wikipedia, Flickr and YouTube organise and aggregate individual 
communications. The Internet, through its expanding array of nodes, favours horizontal peer-
to-peer exchanges over mass media’s top down modes of address and demonstrates an 
“underlying culture of sharing, decentralization and democracy” (Leadbeater 2009,7). Those 
whom Leadbeater calls communitarian optimists, such as Yochai Benkler, advocate 
“principles of the ‘commons’ to inform and ameliorate private capitalism” (Freedman 2012, 
77). This perspective shares much of the CPE critique of capitalist media systems but 
grounds its optimism in the generative properties of the internet to foster non-proprietary 
exchanges whose collective strength will prevail against corporate strategies and capitalist 
logics, albeit after protracted struggles between them. 
Common in much writing is positive evaluation of creativity and empowerment under 
capitalism. Common too, according to CPE scholars, is lack of attention to the organisation 
of communications resources, to the ways contemporary corporate capitalism influences 
development, and the underlying tensions between capitalism and democracy (McChesney 
2013). We now have various critiques of celebrant claims, from early Internet techno-
utopianism to Web 2.0 reconstructions and beyond (Mosco 2005; Mansell 2012) with several 
writers advancing explicit critiques of celebrant claims for journalism (Freedman 2012; 
Curran, Fenton, and Freedman 2012, 2015; McChesney 2013; Hardy 2014). Phillips (2014) 
challenges “myths” about the news business in the digital age, namely that technology killed 
the news audience, the web guarantees diversity, dinosaur journalists killed the industry, 
information wants to be free, and the market will always provide. To complement these 
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accounts, I pursue a different path here, focusing on relevant claims advanced by proponents 
of “convergence culture” and (new) media and creative industry studies. 
 
Culturalist Media Studies 
 
Three overlapping approaches to media analysis have emerged in recent years marking 
various attempts to launch new studies of media industries and production, these are self-
styled “convergence culture’’ “creative industries” and “critical media industries” research.  
There is Jenkins’s (2006) work on convergence culture that focuses on co-creation and user 
participation, developed in Deuze’s studies of media work including journalism. There is the 
creative industries approach of Hartley, Cunningham and others that focuses on innovation 
and entrepreneurship by producers and consumers (Hartley et al 2013). Finally, there is the 
so-called critical media industry studies approach of Havens, Lotz, and Tinic (2009; Havens 
and Lotz 2012) that focuses on production cultures and behaviours of media workers. There 
are differences in the degree to which a critical mantle is claimed, and advocated but 
common across this work is its anchorage in cultural studies and its repudiation of more 
explicitly Marxian or anti-capitalist critical work as rigid, reductive, outdated and 
oppositionist. I will refer to them all together as culturalist media studies (CMS). The degree 
to which journalism is examined varies, but all approaches develop accounts of change that 
have bearing directly and indirectly on the assessment of digital journalism.  
 
Digital plenitude. The Internet facilitates the expansion of media by lowering the barriers to 
publish, to share and to reach audiences. Negroponte (1995, 57) famously declared that the 
monoliths of corporate mass media would dissolve into “an array of cottage industries”. Such 
patently inaccurate pronouncements are rarely repeated verbatim in CMS literature but the 
broader claims that the internet has enabled a post-scarcity communications environment are 
commonplace (Freedman 2012, 72-73). The early twentieth century commercial newspaper 
model of high physical capital, high fixed costs for production, distribution and labour, 
supported by advertising, created significant barriers to market entry in local and national 
news. As distribution costs fall to zero and as distribution overcomes barriers imposed by 
space and time, the Internet allows multimodal communication exchanges that overcome the 
limitations of the ‘mass media’ model of unidirectional, one-to-many communication. A 
central mid-1990s claim was that the Internet would break the control and dominance of 
media conglomerates. In doing so it would help remedy a range of information problems, 
reinvigorate and extend the public sphere and replace information control and scarcity with 
communication abundance. While the push-publishing model of the 1990s web did not fully 
realise such claims, Web 2.0 theorists in the 2000s argued that the spread of “horizontal” 
communications was shrinking the space occupied by gatekeepers and intermediaries. CMS 
analysts recognise the co-presence of different models and sectors, and the threat to the 
generative web and other positive visions from the proprietary business models of legacy 
mass media.  Yet, various grounds for optimism shape how “problems” are perceived. For the 
communitarian optimists, the power of non-proprietary exchange that the internet facilitates 
will not be corralled by capitalist logic. For Jenkins, Deuze and others, capitalism is an 
enabling as well as constraining force for the expansion of popular creativity and 
communication power. 
 
Participation. A greater number and a greater diversity of people can participate in processes 
of creating and co-creating communications. “Traditional ways of producing and consuming 
media for established industries such as television, newspapers and music are profoundly 
changed by the possibilities of engagement and interactivity offered by networked, 
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convergent digital media” argue Hartley et al (2013, 39). Beyond the specific opportunities to 
“talk back” to mass media a more profound set of power shifts are identified, from “top- 
down” corporate management to “bottom-up” involvement, from passive reception to co-
creation. For Jay Rosen (2006) the growing influence of “The People Formerly Known as the 
Audience” will change the way news is produced and consumed. For some this presages a 
public sphere that is populated by a much richer and diverse range of voices beyond the 
traditional gatekeepers (Benkler 2011b). It also expresses faith in a popular will that 
challenges legacy media dinosaurs and will defeat their resistance to the coming of 
“everybody” (Shirky 2008). For Hartley et al the work of public representation, in both its 
media and political forms, is shifting from established representatives to more direct, 
personal control. For Leadbeater (2009) this marks a shift from representation to and for the 
people towards facilitation and sharing with and by users. Yet in much of the literature it is 
commercial enterprises what are at the forefront of “co-creation” initiatives (Hartley et al 
2013, 23). 
 
Reconfiguration and Renewal of journalism. Journalists can collaborate and draw from the 
collective intelligence and labour of countless others in networked environments. The CMS 
scholarship focuses more heavily on entertainment than news media; of the culturalist writers 
mentioned, Deuze provides by far the most extensive examination of journalism, described as 
becoming more liquid as boundaries dissolve between makers and users of news. Deuze 
examines journalism in the context of shifts from solid to “liquid modernity” (Bauman 2000) 
where arrangements and identities, such as those of professional and amateur, blur and 
merge; “The high modernism of journalistic professionalization has moved to a liquid 
modern state of affairs of feverish journalistic differentiation across media genres (including 
popular, tabloid, and infotainment journalisms), platforms, and industries” (Deuze 2005, 
450). 
Various perspectives on existing professional journalism are discernible across this work. 
More radical versions see greater political and cultural diversity and voice for those excluded 
from hegemonic cultural blocs. More affirmative versions see entrepreneurial innovation and 
accommodation to more mobile and dynamic business operations. Increasing disruption to 
business and operational models and fragmentation of the workforce are joined by “the 
creative exploitation of technological affordances by a new generation of reporters and 
editors unfettered by lifelong experience or socialization processes” (Deuze 2008b, 20). 
Against these changes, and entrepreneurial incursions, professional journalists rank amongst 
forces of conservatism for Deuze. Professional journalism is an operationally closed, self-
organizing, and self-defensive social system, communicating social and technological 
affordances in terms of the various ways in which they might “fit” existing hierarchies, and 
traditions of doing newswork. Here Deuze draws on Nikolas Lehmann’s neofunctionalist 
systems theory to examine (old) journalism as a relatively autopoietic system, combined with 
sociological studies of news workers’ struggles to “adapt”. The framing of professionalism 
with a conservative defence of tradition is common across much of the literature.  Meikle 
(2005, 81) places faith in independent media centres (IMCs) to overcome problems of old 
media and disparages those defending the role of professional journalism as ones with “a 
stake in older media”. Other CMS scholars are more cautious; Havens and Lotz (2012, 209) 
argue that “while some observers are optimistic about the possibility for a greater diversity of 
voices in journalism…we need more time to assess what really is happening”. Their “critical” 
analysis rejects deterministic accounts they associate with CPE, in which media professionals 
merely do the bidding of their powerful owners” (23), and instead emphasise professionals’ 
“circumscribed agency” and the drive to popularity that makes commercial media markets 
responsive, while tending “not to be democratic” in valuing lucrative audiences over others 
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(7, 199).  Yet in their broader discussion of different ‘mandates’ for cultural production, they 
share a positive account of market forces generating quality: 
Consider that top journalistic outlets are motivated by commercial goals, and the desire to 
attract audiences that are educated and affluent can lead to rigorous and sophisticated 
reporting in an effort to become established as the most reputable information source. 
(Havens and Lotz 2012, 32).  
 
Criticality and celebration 
 
The three CMS perspectives advocate adopting a more positive account of capitalist 
accumulation as a mechanism for cultural innovation, diversity and empowerment. This 
amounts to a repositioning of so-called “critical” scholarship to offer a more affirmative 
account of commercial media provision in what I call market pluralism. It marks the 
accommodation of a culturalist tradition still concerned with critical questions of power with 
the majority tradition of communications scholarship in the West that has remained liberal 
pluralist and which does not identify problems in commercial media cultures concerning 
provision, access or voice necessitating far-reaching structural reforms.  
In general, CMS perspectives differ from the more breathlessly celebratory accounts of 
Web.2.0 writers such as Tapscott and Williams (2006), who “articulate a deterministic vision 
of frictionless capitalism in which questions of property have been side-lined, profit making 
naturalized and exploitation minimised” (Freedman 2012, 91). Jenkins, Deuze, Lotz and 
others are attendant to critical perspectives and incorporate these into analyses that are alert 
to tensions and contradictions in cultural provision. Jenkins (2006) cautions that “corporate 
resistance to grassroots participation increases” as one moves from niche media industries 
and entrepreneurs to older, mass-market media industries, yet argues that the competitive 
struggle for audience share may force the latter “to take greater risks to accommodate 
consumer interests” (257). Yet these writers advance an accommodation that flattens power 
asymmetries, between owners and media workers, marketers and consumers, and which 
repudiates radical critiques of capitalist media provision.  Jenkins explicitly frames his 
account against what he regards as the “critical pessimism” of CPE critics including 
McChesney (247). For Jenkins, expanding the potential for participation across grassroots 
and commercial media “represents the greatest opportunity for cultural diversity”, the “power 
of participation comes not from destroying commercial culture but from writing over it, 
modding it, amending it, expanding it, adding greater diversity of perspective, and then 
recirculating it, feeding it back into the mainstream media” (257).  For Deuze (2009b, 477) 
“[t]he work that citizen-consumers do …operating in a system of what Benkler describes as 
‘commons-based peer production’ (2006, 60), is at least in part dependent on, contingent with 
and benefiting to, the market-driven efforts of the multinational media enterprise”.  Capitalist 
communications provide environments for creative use and co-creation that enhance freedom 
and independence. We are invited to share a reflexive account alert to critique but 
encouraging a repositioning of scholarship amid positive engagement with industries that 
shape a beneficial transition from old to new.  
 
Political economic responses and analysis 
 
The core response of critical political economists may be summed up as an endorsement of 
much of the positive vision for more culturally diverse and democratic communications 
outlined by celebrants, but an argument that capitalist political economies place significant 
structural limitations on the ability to realise such visions in a manner compatible with 
widening social justice, equity and empowerment.  
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The self-described tradition of a CPE of media is shaped by the interaction of two main 
influences: Marxist thought and democratic politics. It asks questions about power in 
communications and their relationship to the conditions for realising democracy. CPE 
investigates the structuring influence of capitalist economic and social arrangements. Yet 
attention to the relative autonomy of the political sphere and civil sphere, to agency and 
structure, to the interplay of symbolic and economic, informs CPE work in both its classic 
and contemporary forms. The caricature of CPE’s reductive determinism misreads the best 
foundational work but also ignores or downplays the more open, revising and synthesising 
efforts within the CPE tradition (Hardy 2014). The central axiom of CPE is that different 
ways of organising and financing communications have implications for the range and nature 
of media content and services, and the ways in which these are consumed and used.  
Outlined in the first part of the paper are the features of celebrant discourses that include 
techno-optimism (and technological determinism), modernisation narratives, and an 
affirmative aligning of capitalism with individual and collective empowerment. The 
criticality within CMS literature provides resources for more synthesising perspectives, 
explored below. Yet, in general, CMS literature celebrates market empowerment while 
regarding incumbency, bureaucracy and corporate control as threats, so that the principal 
struggle is to wrest control on behalf of a fusion of consumers and citizens, creative workers 
and entrepreneurs. Here CMS literature reproduces tropes from management literature in 
presenting change as imperative adaptation to new and inescapable conditions. Witschge 
(2012, 113) examines how a “technological determinist narrative” of digitalisation was 
mobilised by managements and articulated by newsworkers.  This ostensibly promoted 
audience engagement in journalism but masked an economic agenda of cuts, increased 
workloads and shifts in news agendas and content; it closed off criticisms and other paths that 
could have deployed technology in more progressive ways. The CMS literature is less 
determinist and advocates on behalf of social users not incumbent managers, yet strong 
narratives of adaption and change run through underlying linear accounts of shifts from old to 
new, from solid to liquid modernity, from mass media control to participation. CPE offers a 
critique not only of celebratory claims but of the stagist accounts of change that accompany 
them, assessing how well they serve to reinforce or challenge dominant power interests and 
arrangements.  
 
Journalism, Capitalism and Critique 
 
Internet celebrants and sceptics share a deep flaw that compromises their work, they both 
lack a political economic context, argues McChesney (2013,13): “Both camps miss the ways 
capitalism defines our times and sets the terms for understanding not only the Internet, but 
most everything else of a social nature, including politics in our society”. Celebrants like 
Benkler (2011a, 15), who describes the way the Internet allows non-market behaviour to 
“move from the periphery…to the very core of the global, networked economy” need to 
incorporate a better grasp of the politics and economics of contemporary capitalism. What is 
required is political economic analysis of influence of capitalism on communication 
arrangements. That connects in turn to critical-normative evaluation that draws on Marxian 
and other critiques of capitalism and marketisation, and radical democratic critiques of 
prevailing polity. Likewise, Freedman draws on Marxian political economy in order to 
“integrate the hugely significant developments of the online era into an older account of 
capitalism as a system in which innovation, creativity and, indeed, everyday economic 
performance are structurally subordinated to the needs of the most powerful interests 
operating in the marketplace”. (Freedman 2012, 70) 
The underlying imperative in capitalist systems is competitive accumulation of capital 
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derived from labour and commodity exchange, requiring increases in productivity, reductions 
in labour and other costs, and the ceaseless effort to expand in order to gain a greater share of 
markets and increase the rate of profit. Appreciating these dynamics, together with tendencies 
to crises, is essential to understanding the dominant mode and relations of production in the 
economy, including communications. Yet while there are certainly calls for Marxist analysis 
(Fuchs 2011), the CPE tradition began with strong critiques of economism and other 
tendencies of “vulgar” Marxism to offer reductive and rigid explanations derived from the 
selective application of Marx’s nineteenth-century writings. Marxism provides a rich and 
important historical-conceptual framework but the CPE tradition incorporates broader 
insights to understand the symbolic as well as economic dimensions of cultural production 
and communications, and the public good values that influence journalisms. There is CPE 
analysis across the range of historical and contemporary journalism practices but CPE has 
contributed in particular to analysis of the internetization of mass media, the relationships 
between legacy media and digital natives and the implications of how journalism is financed, 
resourced and organised. It is here the CPE analysis also challenges key arguments of 
celebrants.  
 
Innovators and Incumbents: Media economics and business analysis 
 
The trope of Schumpeterian “creative destruction” has been incessantly invoked to describe 
the disruptive nature of the Internet and allied digital technologies (Schumpeter 1942, 83).  
Competition between incumbents and newcomers is a staple of management literature which 
posits that incumbents will tend to be slow to innovate and instead seek to shore up existing 
markets, processes and advantages, including regulatory support. Innovators shake up 
markets and force changes amongst suppliers for the ultimate benefit of consumers. 
Incumbents who fail to adapt successfully are destined to exit the market. This is a morality 
tale rather than a suitably accurate historical account. The presumptions of mass media 
decline in the first phase of Internet studies (1995-2000) have been challenged by actual 
developments (Küng et al 2008).  First mover advantages tended to be exaggerated by failing 
to account for advantages that existing firms enjoyed, for instance in migrating existing 
consumers to new services. The “new economy” belief that the Internet would diminish the 
advantages of incumbent, large firms and equalise the terms of competition between 
corporate giants and entrepreneurial start-ups failed to take sufficient account of the sustained 
advantages of corporate size and reach (Curran, Fenton and Freedman 2012). 
Media conglomerates pursue strategies to seek to maintain dominant market positions, 
through investment, branding, cross-promotion and advertiser relationships (McChesney 
2003, 2008), control over gateways to services, efforts to control intellectual property, and 
expanding sources of control through economic surveillance and data mining to track and 
target users (Turow 2006, 2011). Some of these strategies proved unsuccessful at the level of 
firms or sectors, but all remain relevant advantages. Corporations have greater access to 
capital than SMEs, can invest in online businesses as a form of research and development, 
and can seek to outspend rivals and outlast competition. The costs of maintaining Murdoch’s 
short-lived Ipad-only publication The Daily were estimated at $2 million per year for running 
costs and promotion alone, requiring 2 per cent of total Ipad users in the United States to 
subscribe 99 cents per week in order to break even.   
There is support for Chris Anderson’s “new economy” proposition that online inventory 
overcomes the physical and cost constraints of goods displayed on store shelves, making low-
volume sales to specialist markets economically viable and allowing producers to exploit “the 
millions of niche markets at the shallow end of the bitstream” (Anderson 2004). However, 
this ‘long tail’ thesis is better at explaining retailing than content creation and is “irrelevant” 
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in markets where barriers to entry remain high (Hindman 2009, 100). Media companies were 
also well placed to exploit their own “long tail” of back catalogue inventory that could be 
marketed and digitally distributed at little cost. Digitalisation expands opportunities to 
repurpose entertainment and information, complementing strategies of multimedia 
consolidation and using a web platform “perfectly matched” for the media conglomerates 
which have been assembled (Schiller 2000).  
The challenges of operating cross-media activities increase advantages for well- 
established content providers. Taken together these advantages help to explain the patterns of 
dominance of major media firms in general news publishing and high-cost audiovisual 
content. That presence challenges myths not only of a new economics but also (pre-digital) 
myths of a dynamic, self-correcting capitalism, both of which ignore or underestimate market 
and political strategies to maintain dominance. In 1998 more than three-quarters of the 31 
most visited US news and entertainment websites were affiliated with large media firms, 
most of the rest were connected to outfits like AOL and Microsoft. Alexa’s ranking of top 
news sites today shows the dominance of legacy media brands, even though these have now 
been joined by pure play “digital natives” such as Reddit (ranked one) and Huffington Post, 
bought by AOL for $315 million in 2011. 
However, market environments across digital media are characterised by high volatility in 
which industry boundaries are unclear, business models evolve rapidly, consumer preferences 
are uncertain, and competition comes from hitherto unknown players (Küng et al 2008, 127). 
Disruption for news media is ongoing, with increasing adoption of smartphones and tablets to 
access news, and patterns vary significantly across media systems: 
in some countries like Finland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom traditional brands still 
dominate online news[…]By contrast, in the United States pure players have pretty much 
caught up with traditional news providers and the same is true of social media sources in 
urban Brazil. (Newman and Levy 2015, 40).  
Digitalisation “offers both significant advantages as well as challenges to traditional media 
interests” (Freedman 2006, 278). The culture of free and the enormous inventory of content 
available without direct charge have meant media firms have struggled to finance online 
activities in several markets. Profit-making media companies are variously challenged by 
competition from other supplies of “professional” media, by “amateur” content creation, and 
by pro-am hybridisations mixing both. Many of the US digital natives are small non-profits, 
started since 2005, and producing relatively inexpensive local or hyperlocal coverage (Pew 
2014; for the United Kingdom see Williams, Harte and Turner 2015) There has been a 
significant expansion of “horizontal” media content used for interpersonal and intergroup 
communication. This challenges and displaces “old” media in various ways, notably in time 
spent consuming professional content, but how far it mitigates concerns about the range and 
quality of supply of public media content is a central issue for debate. 
 
Concentration, content and exposure diversity 
 
Market power, the ability to demand and obtain high prices and remain relatively free of 
competitive pressures has generally diminished for news media as Internet penetration has 
increased (Benkler 2011b). Yet, it is mythic and inaccurate, argue CPE scholars, to suggest 
that market power problems from media concentration and control of gateways, to cartel-like 
behaviour and restrictions on supply, are themselves diminishing. The supply of news 
remains heavily concentrated in many markets. In the United Kingdom just three companies 
dominate 71 per cent of the national newspaper market. Including online news, the top five 
companies hold some 80 per cent market share (House of Lords Select Committee on 
Communications 2008, 46). 
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Most US newspapers were in private hands until last quarter of the twentieth century, but 
increasing consolidation into chain ownership from 1970s meant that by 2011 40 per cent of 
new organisations were owned by public corporations (Baker 1994; Lee-Wright, Phillips and 
Witschge 2012, 6). Inheritance tax was a factor in family-owned businesses selling but the 
chief driver was the super profits that could be made from local monopoly papers. Between 
1991 and 2000 US newspaper advertising revenues rose 60 per cent and profit margins reach 
27 per cent nearly double their 1990 rate; yet modest staff expansion over that period was 
reversed after 2001 with cuts across print and broadcast news (Pew 2004). However, 
tendencies to monopoly were ameliorated in other systems. In much of Scandinavia and other 
European countries a strong history of direct and indirect subsidies aided papers that would 
have failed or shrunk without such social market interventions. In southern Europe, and the 
United Kingdom, “…serious news has never been wholly commercial and has often been 
loss-making […] subsidized by political parties, or cross-subsidised by other businesses, or 
by wealthy proprietors with an interest in maintaining their position” (Phillips 2012, 87). 
Worldwide, private ownership was the dominant form of newspaper (60 per cent) at the start 
of this century, with only a minority being publicly traded (3 per cent) or employee owned (4 
per cent) and the rest government owned (Picard and van Weezel 2008, 24). In advanced 
capitalist economies corporate consolidation accelerated in the 1990s; deregulation and 
opening up media markets to foreign investments, led to increased transnational ownership, 
cross-media ownership and convergence in domestic markets. Increasingly news businesses 
became units in conglomerates focused on profit making with often sizeable footprints in 
entertainment and marketing communications sectors. 
CPE scholars are perhaps best known for the range of studies of media ownership and 
concentration, addressing processes of consolidation in content industries and the continuing 
salience of “economies of synergy” (Arsenault and Castells 2008, 710). Yet, contemporary 
work also addresses complex patterns of corporate convergence and de-convergence and the 
creation of new kinds of networks and interdependencies between firms (Winseck and Jin 
2012). The CPE literature also examines monopolistic tendencies within new digital 
economies that run counter to celebrant rhetoric from Negroponte onwards. Five digital 
media companies Google, Facebook, Baidu, Yahoo! and Microsoft currently have 68 per cent 
share of all global digital advertising expenditure. As the gateway to news and other media 
content, Google commands 95 per cent of search on mobiles devices in the United Kingdom 
and only marginally less via desktop computers (88.6 per cent) (Media Reform Coalition 
2015). The new digital giants demonstrate the significance of network effects, and demand-
side economies of scale generating “winner-takes-all” markets (Hindman 2009). In the 
United States Apple’s iTunes has some 64 per cent of the music download market; YouTube 
71.5 per cent of online videoand  Facebook 38 per cent of social networking traffic 
(Freedman 2016, 108).  Against a variety of presumptions of market expansion and digital 
pluralism political economists have provided explanations for the patterns of old and new 
concentration that persist in media markets.  
The CPE analysis highlights the persistence of problems of news content diversity, but 
also of source diversity and the significance, amidst a vast increase in content overall, of 
exposure diversity (Napoli 2011).  Internet users have ready access, in a technical sense, to 
richer sources of information, alternative ideas and imagery than at any time in history. Yet, 
studies have found that content aggregators’ search results tend not to give prominence to 
alternative news sources. A study of Google’s and Yahoo’s listings in relation to five public 
affairs issues found that no alternative news sites featured in the first page of search results 
(Redden and Witschge 2010). News aggregators, like Yahoo and Google, provide little by 
way of original news material and instead rely heavily on the newsfeeds of the major news 
agencies (Paterson 2006). According to UK regulator Ofcom (2007, 3), “news outlets of all 
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kinds often tell the same stories, from the same perspective, using much the same material”. 
The Pew Research Center’s study tracking stories over a week of media coverage in 
Baltimore found that 8 out of 10 stories “simply repeated or repackaged previously published 
information”, with most original news stories produced by legacy media, notably the 
Baltimore Sun, whose origination of news stories had fallen by more than 30 per cent over 
the previous decade (Pew 2010). Yet the professional journalism itself was still heavily 
dependent on official sources and press releases for 86 per cent of the news stories. Within 
CMS literature problems of monopolisation are acknowledged but tend to be downplayed 
while CPE accounts are dismissed as too deterministic, reductive or anecdotal. The call for 
suitably sophisticated analysis must be a shared agenda, but CPE analysis has shown 
problems across market provision that undermine claims that anything other than public 




The core response of CPE scholars to celebratory accounts of digital empowerment has been 
that the Internet reduces some but not all costs, and that those remaining costs serve as 
market entry barriers. Internetisation reduces some creation and production costs and reduces 
distribution costs to at or near zero. Marketing costs and activity are aided by networking 
capabilities, however the resources for visibility and reach remain significant costs barriers. 
Amongst the highest cost for news publishers, though, remains staffing, for the vast majority 
of offline and online operations, made up of journalistic jobs, administration, sales and 
marketing, administration, IT and distribution. A review of the largest UK local news 
providers found that their staff costs accounted for between 39 and 58 per cent of total costs 
between 2008 and 2013 (News Media Association 2015, 42). 
How journalism is financed is a shared concern for mainstream and critical economists. 
Where CPE is distinctive is it is interest in how different forms of financing influence what is 
produced, what kinds of content and viewpoints are favoured and disfavoured. Financing 
news media through sales alone has become increasingly challenging: 
Hard news is perhaps the hardest to make profitable. It is increasingly instant, 
constant and commoditised … With rare exceptions, making money in news means 
publishing either the cheap kind that attracts a very large audience, and making 
money from ads, or the expensive kind that is critical to a small audience, and making 
money from subscription. Both are cut-throat businesses. (The Economist (2012)  
Most commercial online ventures remain heavily cross-subsidised and parasitic on other 
profit-making activities, with no truly viable model for sustaining independent online news 
content established, except ones reliant of investment, such as Murdoch’s $70 million 
investment in the profitable Vice Media, on unpaid labour or marketer’s content. An 
important counter trend to declining paid-circulation has been the growth of free newspapers 
along urban commuter routes attracting advertisers to upscale readers. However, while some 
free papers have been viable, the costs of producing online news have generally not been 
recouped through combined revenues from advertising, subscription or micro-payment 
methods. 
Advertising finance has shifted from print to online and, more broadly, away from media 
publications to online behavioural advertising to reach users in their digital locations, from 
search to social. The various ramifications of these shifts are profound and vital for 
understanding digital journalism. The deal, whereby advertising paid for journalism to attract 
readers who would see their advertisements, has been unravelling since the early 1990s as 
marketers have found more direct, information-rich and cost-effective ways to track and 
target consumers online. Efforts to make good the loss of advertising by more effective 
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retailing, through paywalls, micropayments and subscription have so far largely failed 
(Myllylahti 2014). Successful monetisation online is mostly restricted to products serving 
elite or specialist audiences, where there are attributes of high-value content (relatively non-
reproducible and/or fast), scarcity in supply, valued user interface and enhanced cross-
platform availability. Pay models have tended to stall after reaching a small segment of their 
total consumer market, with news organisations “focusing on maximizing revenue from those 
who are prepared to pay” (Newman and Levy 2015, 12). For general, public-facing 
journalism cultures of “free” prevail (Chyi and Lee 2013) and are expected to continue, with 
“no evidence that large numbers of consumers will ever pay for commoditized news that is 
freely available elsewhere” (Kaye and Quinn, 2010, 177). A survey by the Internet 
Advertising Bureau (Jackson, 2015) found that UK adults were prepared to pay only 92p a 
month to access news websites, less than they were prepared to spend on email, search or on-
demand video. Across a 10-country survey (Newman and Levy, 2015) only 11 per cent 
reported paying for digital news in the last 12 months. The outcome has been a massive loss 
of income for most legacy publishers operating advertising-subsidised news businesses. 
Digital revenue growth has failed to compensate for print decline, while adding to costs in 
set-up, marketing and operations. For the Guardian, a 20 per cent increase in digital revenues 
helped bring losses for 2014-15 to £19.1 million, down from £19.4 million the previous year. 
At the New York Times, digital advertising accounted for nearly a third (32.5 per cent) of 
total ad revenue in 2014, but print advertising revenue losses again overwhelmed the digital 
gains, with an overall fall in advertising revenue of 5.5 per cent (Advertising Age 2015a). 
Internet advertising, while growing, tends to be insufficient to sustain media firms’ online 
activities, and is very unevenly distributes between top news sites and the rest (Pew 2015). 
Above all, advertising revenues have accrued to providers of search, online classified 
advertising and other services, notably social networking. Google, now the largest media 
company by revenue, accounted for 49 per cent of internet advertising revenue worldwide 
with an estimated 82 per cent share of paid search expenditure in 2012 (Zenith Optimedia 
2013). Google was expected to have 55 per cent share of global search advertising spending 
in 2015, even though that market grew by nearly 20 per cent. These beneficiaries of 
advertising finance lack the capacity, or incentive, to reproduce the forms of content creation 
that are becoming unsustainable. As a UK Government report summarised: 
The increasingly easy and perfect digital replicability of content makes it harder to 
monetise creative rights. The growth of Internet aggregators [such as Google and 
Yahoo] has been good for advertisers who find new cheap and direct routes to those 
they need to reach. It is also good for consumers, providing them with free search, 
email…access to social networks, to create and enjoy user-generated content and 
multiple other applications. But what aggregators do not do in any quantity is fund the 
creation of long-form professional content. (DCMS/BERR 2009, 16-17) 
 
Native advertising and integration  
 
Digital journalism is at the apex of two key trends in media –advertising relationships: 
towards the disaggregation of advertising and media, and towards the greater integration of 
advertising within media. Native advertising and other forms of branded content have grown 
rapidly and become a major focus for marketers within the last five years. Native advertising 
refers to promotional messages that match the form and behaviour of the digital media in 
which they are disseminated. Such advertisements appear in news feeds, publishers’ 
websites, search results, posts in social media, email and other digital communications. 
Native advertising is an online variant of advertorials, associated with magazine publishing, 
and like advertorials, follows the form and user experience associated with the context in 
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which they are placed. Yet, where advertorials are generally labelled as advertising, much 
native advertising is intended to disguise its ad status, with rules on identification and 
transparency still being negotiated between regulators and industries (Advertising Age 
2015b). In the UK content and native advertising grew to £509m in 2014, accounting for 22 
per cent of all display advertising expenditure. Billed as the saviour for newspapers losing 
traditional ad revenue, publishers from the New York Times to the Guardian, Daily Mail, 
Mashable and Refinery29 deploy editorial staff or special teams to create native advertising. 
The Guardian newspaper’s Guardian Labs, for instance, worked on 400 branded content 
projects in 2015. Jarvis (2015) a strong proponent of newspapers pursuing commercial 
strategies nevertheless regards native as “dangerous, the wolf in sheep’s clothing”, “trying to 
trick [readers] into clicking on what may look, sound, and smell like a headline leading to 
editorial content but ends up being a long and wordy marketing message”. Some laud 
branded content as adaptive strategies to sustain advertising-supported journalism. CPE 
perspectives highlight the detrimental externalities arising from such transactions: the erosion 
of journalistic independence and integrity; the reorientation of editorial policies, the rise of 
economic surveillance and the shifts in power of voice and influence towards marketers. 
Advertising has long been the major patron of commercial media. Yet various regulatory 
and market mechanisms set limits on that patronage. Regulations and industry norms upheld 
principles of separation of advertising and editorial. Market arrangements tended to work 
against advertisers exercising direct, instrumental power over editorial content. Marketers 
controlled adverts (so-called paid media) but not the content around them. Public relations 
(PR) professionals pursued “earned” media that they could not fully control. The shifts we 
are seeing certainly pre-date digitalisation but increasingly marketers’ control is extending 
from advertising forms to integrated editorial forms. This involves a mix of instrumental and 
structural power by advertisers, but also complex attenuation, as decision-making spreads 
across digital advertising networks and into programmatic advertising buying and other forms 
of automation, such as advertisement content-recommendation engines used to place branded 
content onto publishers’ websites. 
The convergence of media and marketing communications is affecting journalism at all 
levels from corporate structures to work practices and cultures, forms, formats and 
relationships with users. It is influencing new, hybrid PR-journalistic arrangements as third-
party content farms and in –house branded content units produce and process stories and 
other materials on behalf of marketers. Sponsored content overlaps with broader 
marketisation efforts, such as articles written in response to popular search terms 
(McChesney 2013, 188). Commercial news media have also embraced commercialisation 
strategies from selling merchandise to transactional journalism with third-party wholesalers 
and retailers. This has brought them closer in skills, personnel and mentality to the “content 
marketing” proposition of marketers, part of an ongoing convergence of owned, paid, earned 
and shared media. Marketing logics increasingly shape editorial decisions. Audience metrics 
“make possible granular data about news consumption – including which stories receive 
attention when and which go unclicked” and undermine journalist derived news values 
(Carlson 2015, 852).  
News organisations have become increasingly dependent on a widening range of 
“information subsidies” (Gandy 1982) that include news agencies, recycled, repurposed and 
plagiarised material from other publications, and, most of all, PR output from commercial 
and political sources.  In the United States, public relations practitioners outnumber editorial 
staff by a ratio of four to one (McChesney and Nichols 2010). Lewis, Williams and 
Franklin’s (2008) study of UK news found that 19 per cent of national news stories and 17 
per cent of broadcasts were derived entirely or mainly from PR-supplied material. Numerous 
studies including ones on US foreign reporting (Herman and Chomsky, 2002), demonstrate 
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how such source dependencies work against editorial balance, autonomy and objectivity 
norms.   
The influence of advertising finance, marketers’ influence on media provision and the 
power asymmetries arising from marketers’ ability to pay for presence tends to be 
downplayed in CMS accounts. While the descriptive contribution of CMS scholarship is 
immense, the evaluation of phenomena such as branded content is problematic, derived from 
CMS’s affirmative reading of shifts towards greater consumer empowerment under 
capitalism. Deuze regards journalists’ defence of editorial integrity and against marketers (the 
firewall) as part of a conservative ideology to resist change:  
Reporters across the globe feel that their work can only thrive and flourish in a society 
that protects its media from censorship; in a company that saves its journalists from 
the marketers…Any kind of development from perceived extra-journalistic forces – 
be it public criticism, marketing or corporate ownership – tends to get filtered through 
this overriding concern to be autonomous to tell the stories you want to…[This] 
serves as a way to preclude attempts by individual news people to be more interactive 
and supportive of community engagement in their work. (Deuze 2005, 448) 
The message of conservatism versus enlightened change is unmistakable but it is notable that 
amongst the pro-social values espoused, is a call to embrace marketers’ participation. Deuze 
(2009a, 317) frames the issue as one of adaption to a complex present involving a “wholesale 
redistribution of agency away from those who tend to crave only one thing: creative and 
editorial autonomy”. Yet as Witschge (2012b, 133) remarks: “If creative and editorial 
autonomy does not currently lie with journalists, we need to ask where it does lie”. There is a 
blindspot in addressing the concentrations of economic power structuring journalism. By 
contrast, Witschge argues economic imperatives have considerably weakened the position of 
journalists requiring more critical-normative consideration of what professional values are 
worth saving and investing in before assuming the public can and should take over any of the 
journalistic tasks. 
 
Labour, co-production and power 
 
Considerations of media work recur across central debates, from analysing the causes of 
“crisis” in news businesses, to assessing the gains and losses of de-professionalisation and 
“participation”, to overall considerations of changes in resourcing journalism. For many 
critical scholars, the Internet precipitated but did not cause a crisis in US journalism which is 
attributed largely to corporate greed involving short-termism and hypercommercialism, 
traced to the drive for super profits embarked on from the 1970s. According to Cooper (2011) 
advertising revenue net of circulation increased dramatically from 1970 to 2000, faster than 
Gross Domestic Product. The resources were available to sustain quality journalism, he 
argues, but the commercial model adopted saw profits extracted by stockholders rather than 
reinvested in journalism. More mainstream perspectives emphasise changing market 
conditions, for instance Benkler (2011b, 372) argues that the “ability to extract rents and use 
them to subsidize newsrooms had begun to change just before the emergence of the Internet 
into widespread use”. Certainly the “crisis”, where applicable, involves the interaction of 
different factors, including technology, market and demand-side changes, yet CPE studies of 
the United States, United Kingdom and elsewhere commonly highlight corporate 
disinvestment. In the United States, debt-laden corporations, having run down journalistic 
resources through cost-cutting and other measures to maintain profits, have been abandoning 
newspaper operations altogether during the latest recession; the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, for 
instance, cut staff from 165 to the 20 retained for its future, online-only presence, 
contributing to the estimated 200,000 media jobs lost in the United States over five years 
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(McChesney and Nichols 2010). Journalistic media based on professional routines and 
deadlines has been particularly affected with many firms seeking “productivity” gains to feed 
and compete with 24-hour news that critics say leave journalists more desk-bound and 
dependent on sources. According to one study: 
 In many, but not all, EU countries this type of journalism is increasingly suppressed 
or replaced by less expensive free-lancing, with journalists working under 
deteriorating or even degrading working conditions and having insufficient resources 
to pursue stories in depth. More and more news is provided by agencies (European 
Commission 2013, 28).  
In such conditions journalists tend to be desk-bound, formulaic and to have increased 
dependence on sources and on PR-originated material (Davies 2008; Lewis, Williams and 
Franklin 2008, Jackson and Moloney 2015). Digital natives such as Vice, Politico and 
BuzzFeed hail from a sector that is modestly growing its paid workforce, with 468 digital 
news organizations in the United States producing nearly 5,000 full-time jobs; some 
commercial operators like BuzzFeed have grown rapidly, from half a dozen employees to 
over 170 in two years, yet around half are small, non-profits with three full-time staff or less 
with unstable, precarious finances (Pew 2014).  
Digital publishing saves around 30 per cent of production and distribution costs of print, 
but leaves the sector woefully underfunded and prone to precarity in employment in ways 
that the celebrants of “networked journalism” such as Shirky, Jarvis and Beckett evade or 
downplay. Deuze offers rich and incisive analysis of shifts in work but the governing 
framework is problematic for CPE in its invocation of more benign power relations. For 
instance, Deuze (2009b, 475) writes that “a trend toward flexibilization of production and 
labour is accelerating throughout the media industries, which in turn signals less power over 
the creative process flowing from large media conglomerates, and increases co-creative 
relationships between media professionals inside and outside of firms, as well as between 
consumers and producers of media”. To find increased increasing precarity an indicator of 
diminishing corporate power is panglossian. Elsewhere Deuze argues, more persuasively, that 
The promises and challenges of a more participatory news gathering and distribution system 
cannot be understood without factoring the industry side of the equation… [including] 
redistributing risk away from the company (to the employee) and increasing the cost-
effectiveness of production away from labor (to the audience, or ‘prosumer’). (Deuze 2008a)  
 
Emergent Digital Journalisms 
 
The central debate is whether emergent trends promise and prefigure a better journalism. 
CMS scholars in particular focus on the prospects of widening participation and voice, and 
highlight cultural and social gains from the weakening of forms of editorial constriction, 
control and gatekeeping associated with legacy media. Another focus of promise across 
critical scholarship is the expansion of alternative journalism (Atton and Hamilton 2008). 
Historically the CPE tradition has been erratic in its engagement with alternative or radical 
media, sometimes dismissing it as marginal to the task of democratising “mass” public media 
but aligned in values and purposes with the expansion of radical and “critical” media (Fuchs 
2011; Atton and Hamilton 2008; McChesney 2013; AUTHOR 2014). CPE analyses 
emphasise that we need to recognize differences between institutionalised arrangements and 
individual or relatively unorganized forms of participation, and between the different forms 
of finance, organisation and practices, governance and purposes shaping journalistic outputs. 
Benkler (2011b) offers a useful mapping of what he calls an emerging networked fourth 
estate. The first group are “core players in the mass media environment” (376), incorporating 
decentralised elements. Second are new, smaller scale commercial sites (digital natives). 
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Third is the non-profit sector comprising “professional-journalism-focused nonprofits” (377-
88) such as ProPublica. Fourth are “non-media nonprofits” like the Sunlight Foundation 
“using a combination of standard nonprofit organization with peer production to achieve 
significant results in the public sphere”. Fifth is a “new” party press culture on collaborative 
platforms such as the Daily Kos or Newsvine. Sixth are communications of millions of 
decentralized individuals who “play an absolutely critical role in this new information 
ecosystem”. 
The CMS literature has an elective affinity with deepening cultural participation and so 
while its celebratory evaluations are critiqued by CPE scholars (Fuchs 2011), it does offer the 
most detailed investigation of these aspects of cultural convergence. In their political 
economic study of online journalism Vujnovic et al (2010, 11) find “much support for 
[Jenkins’] proposition that convergence is driven by a need to develop consumer loyalty amid 
market fragmentation that threatens old ways of doing business […]it works primarily by 
building consumer loyalty or brand sustainability. It also can be driven by a management 
desire to cut cost of information gathering by engaging audiences to perform a journalistic 
function that previously was performed by paid professionals”. There is broad agreement that 
participation and co-creation are increasingly significant; at issue however are the more 
general claims for power shifts and the requirements for critical scrutiny of specific practices. 
CPE critiques range from the overstatement of participation levels and activities by 
celebrants to critiques of the ideological conflation of concepts of political empowerment 
with the celebration of consumer engagement in commodification (Fuchs 2011). Freedman 
(Curran, Fenton and Freedman 2016, 107) states that “far from signalling a democratisation 
of media production and distribution, ‘prosumption’ is all too often incorporated within a 
system of commodity exchange controlled by existing elites”. Research on participation in 
journalism find varying but often very low levels of engagement (Newman and Levy 2015, 
73-74). There is greater common ground between CPE and “critical” culturalist studies in 
analysing the tensions, contradictions and struggles between different modalities of power 
and communicative exchange: commercial, public service and gift (Murdock 2003).  
 
Politics, governance and media reform 
 
CPE analysis connects media practices and environments to the processes through which 
their governance is enacted and contested. The analysis of powers in regulatory space is 
integral to understanding how communications are and might be organised, but are often 
displaced from accounts that naturalise convergence. Affirmative discourses on digital 
convergence were intellectual justification for waves of deregulation in media markets, and 
“downplayed the usual logic of capital concentration as a cause” (Winston 2006, 377). From 
the analysis of structural problems flow efforts to develop and achieve structural media 
reforms (McChesney 2003, 2013). Such efforts generally focus on measure to tackle 
concentration and use combinations of industry levies or taxes for direct or indirect public 
subsidies to expand media pluralism. 
Digital technologies and networking affordances can be applied to improve journalism 
immeasurably against the old professional model. That is what is so compelling about the 
networked fourth estate envisioned by Benkler and other celebrants. For this to happen, 
though, requires funding to support a diverse and independent non-profit sector. At stake are 
the policy implications that flow from assessing the state of journalistic fields. CPE is aligned 
to what Jenkins calls “critical pessimism” in so far as it considers there to be “problems” that 
require action. The problems of legacy media concentration, for instance, would matter much 
less if content diversity were as rich and blossoming as envisioned. However, leading news 
brands have been helped in defending their oligopolies by the weakness of their challengers 
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(Curran 2012,19). Online revenues can sustain new commercial models models but only the 
smallest web-based news organisations, with few online independents being profitable or 
even self-financing (Pew 2014, 2015). The celebrants, argues McChesney (2013, 175), have 
either greatly undervalued the importance of having independent competing institutions and 
resources, including living wages for reporters, “or have overestimated the capacity of the 
market to produce such a system, or both”. 
 
Part 3 Reflection on theory, analysis and approach 
 
The contribution of CPE is both analytical and critical-normative and there is a necessary 
linkage but also tensions between the two. CPE’s analytical focus can expand to address any 
journalisms or communication practices. By contrast, normative perspectives are situated and 
localised; as an interventionist tradition, critical political economists address deficiencies, 
options and prospects in particular media systems. Yet to advance, the critical-normative 
needs to be opened up to more reflexive consideration: what is of value – to investigate, 
appreciate, support, promote? What tasks and forms of journalism are being privileged? A 
guiding normative perspective in CPE work is that core journalistic jobs need to be 
undertaken to reach and inform as many affected by a polity as possible. This informs a 
perspective that is affiliated with radical alternative media but which is suspicious of 
celebrating, as sufficient, media at the margins. Instead a focus remains on the performance 
and capacities of dominant media, with the need to mobilise critique for structural reform.  
McChesney (2013, 82-84) bases his normative argument on requirements for news media 
to support democratic self-government, objectives that remain in tension with the capitalist 
basis of commercial news media. This requires competition between providers, but also 
significant material resources to organise journalism. It must be an open system, so anyone 
can practise, but it requires “great institutions”, with paid journalists as well as copyeditors, 
fact checkers and proofreaders and the “institutional muscle to stand up to governments and 
corporate power”. To CMS critics, that perspective can appear overly focused on the 
resourcing of a particular kind of professional journalism, locked in a defence or 
reconstruction of traditional media. In fact, it is quite otherwise, insisting on a critique of the 
deficiencies of twentieth century US professional journalism. As a solution, McChesney 
(2013, 211) advocates a “heterogeneous system, with different structures and subsidy 
systems, and significant nonprofit competition”, with “an immediate expansion of public, 
community, and student media”.  
In line with the broader analysis offered above, the Internet is not substituting for the 
overall loss of journalistic resources. The growth of “dissident websites, social media, and 
smartphones” used by activists to bypass traditional gatekeepers is welcomed, but “the 
illusion that this constitutes satisfactory journalism is growing thinner” (McChesney 2013, 
194). The resource base for non-profit journalism is insufficient, supporting a few thousand 
employees, compared to the 120,000 full-time paid journalists in the United States two 
decades ago (198). Yet there is something paradoxical in the articulation of normativity. Past 
structures serve as source of critique but also reference for loss. Commercial media functions 
as both agent of decline and marker of pre-decline institutional arrangements. The celebrant 
literature overstates diversity and fails to address the consequences of the lack of resource 
and of resource inequalities. Yet in making these essential arguments, this CPE response 
privileges a variant of professional-era institutional arrangements. An approach that 
maintains CPEs focus on resources but draws on culturalists’ exploration of diversifying 
practices and identifications would be best placed to map the range of digital journalisms, 
while continuing that normative-critical debate on the journalisms social systems need.  
A related critique is that McChesney’s CPE position “misses an essential element of 
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political activity – the role of citizens”; Hrvatin and Petković (2015, 112-113) advocate a 
media pluralism approach “in which the question of who speaks, when, where and why is 
repeatedly asked”, at the level of media systems but also concerning the role of journalism 
“as a specific form of political knowledge”. McChesney’s CPE analysis advances on 
celebrant and sceptic accounts, but what is required are wider “[d]eliberations and 
negotiations on how a plural media system should look” (Hrvatin and Petković 2015, 113). 
CPE mounts a critique of celebratory accounts for their lack of attention to the material 
resources need to sustain them. At the same time opening up normative values and 
assumptions to scrutiny allows for a more productive dialogue with culturalist perspectives 
about what kinds of arrangements are desirable, including to foster counter-hegemonic 
communications practices. What culturalist traditions, in particular, have brought is a strong 
focus on the reconfiguration of practices and relationships with audiences and co-creators in 
journalism. Culturalism has also brought a range of concerns with power and voice, with 
relations of dominance. There is no “resolution” to evaluations of different practices but there 
are some approaches that may help to generate more fruitful analysis, engagements and 
integration of different perspectives. 
First, there is value in pursuing a comparative media systems approach that aspires to 
consider the organisation and distribution of journalistic work in toto as it pertains to people 
organised under political economic and governance systems. Approached in this way we can 
take up CPEs concern with the organisation of “mass”, public-facing journalism with 
attention to the range of networked fourth estate. The latter is shaped to varying degrees by 
‘vertical’ arrangements in states and by “horizontal” arrangements such as diasporic media, 
foreign commercial and non-commercial media and other transnational and transcultural 
communication flows. Comparative media systems analysis of journalism (Curran 2011, 47-
60; Lee-Wright, Phillips and Witschge 2012) is sensitive to changes in journalism but also 
tends to focus on more mainstream practices and conceptions. So there is scope to combine 
insights of critical culturalist and CPE scholarship in addressing both the diversity of 
journalistic production and greater reflexivity towards the concepts, and norms, deployed.  
Radical democratic perspectives extend liberal norms to argue for media to enhance the 
material conditions and voice of those lacking power. Media should facilitate processes of 
deliberation and exchange but also aid self-constitution and mobilisation by social 
movements and interest groups (Baker 2002; Curran, 2002, 217-247). Radical democrats 
have proposed that this can be achieved by having a combination of media sectors, 
differentially organised and financed, generating different communication spaces, forms and 
styles. Curran (2002) proposes a core public service sector encircled by private, social 
market, professional and civil media sectors. While constructed to address problems in 
Western media systems, such models can aid in considering suitably pluralistic arrangements 
today and encouraging specific, relational and system-wide analysis of journalism practices. 
Media business literature provides insights into the economics and management of digital 
journalism but offers limited articulation across the full range of dimensions that media 
studies grapples with: economic, political, organisational, practice-based, ethical, symbolic, 
social, and cultural. Those dimensions are examined by both main traditions I have outlined 
above, CPE and culturalist media scholarship. The latter is stronger in many areas, notably in 
investigating what people make and do with communications in their social interactions.  
CMS has offered close analysis of media industries and media work, including journalism 
and this renewed focus is beneficial for communications scholarship as a whole. It integrates 
studies of production, consumption and use appropriate for understanding contemporary 
convergence practices and cultures.  My argument is that this culturalist scholarship is 
valuable but offers a series of problematic evaluations derived from its affirmative account of 
consumer empowerment under capitalism. The CPE tradition is needed here for its greater 
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attention to power asymmetries under the structuring influence of capitalism, and for its 
attention to regulation and governance, not least the weakening of protections against 
advertisers paying the piper, influencing the playlist and playing the tunes.  
There is no easily retrievable stasis outside the oscillating vortex of voices of optimists 
and pessimists, celebrants and sceptics. In his important contribution McChesney (2013) 
argues that CPE can address the blindspots in both, by examining the material conditions of 
communications as an indispensable component of answering questions about 
communication power, access, reach and opportunity. That also requires a reflexive scrutiny 
of CPE’s own normativity and engagement with a wider set of debates on the changing 
practices of journalism, and changing meanings and values of communication production to 
which CMS literature contributes. While their affirmative assessments will remain deeply 
contested by critical scholars, there are grounds for renewing critical media studies by 
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